The first one takes into account the fact that infants and young children display this capacity, but lack conceptual-level cognitive skills.
#IOBSERVE CEDRIC WINDOWS DOWNLOAD#
( Download final version at ) We propose two adjustments to the classic view of shared intentionality (our capacity to share mental states of various sorts) as based on conceptual-level cognitive skills. Weak joint actions still require considerable cognitive abilities indeed. As a result, even if the links between individuals are seriously stretched, much is still shared among them. Although structurally weaker, this common knowledge has a richer content in weak joint actions.
I then defend the relevance of common knowledge against several criticisms, point at an adequate weakening, and discuss alternative approaches. To this end, I first argue for the necessity of common knowledge for joint action in general due to the increased reliability of success it entails. I argue that one major reason why the definition of such collective actions is akin to the classical ones, is because it crucially relies on the concept of common knowledge. However, they cannot fit some perplexing cases of weak joint action, such as demonstrations, where agents rely on distinct epistemic sources and as a result have no first-hand knowledge about each other. Over the last three decades, joint action has received various definitions, which for all their differences share many features.
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